1950
Submitted by nazirahmed on Sat, 05/17/2008 - 10:42.
- March 14: Security Council adopts resolution of reflecting intention of MaCnaughton proposals. It appoints a UN Representative to replace UNCIP and calls upon Pakistan and India to prepare and execute within five months "a programme of demilitarisation" on basis of MaCnaughton proposals or on "mutually agreed modifications thereof".
- April 12: Security Council appoints Sir Own Dixon, eminent jurist from Australia, as UN Representative. Appointment is accepted by both parties.
- June-July: Owen Dixon conducts intensive negotiations with governments of Pakistan and India and also meets Shaikh Abdullah in Srinagar and Ghulam Abbas in Muzaffarabad. He is struck by peculiar nature of situation
- The two governments acknowledge objective of plebiscite but disagree on measures necessary for it. India takes stand that Pakistan is an "aggressor" and should be so declared, that there must be "no impairment of, or prejudice to, the recognition of the sovereignty of the State of Jammu and Kashmir" (meaning the Indian-sponsored regime) and that its authority should be recognised on both sides of the ceasefire line. In a concession to India in view of its rejection of the UNCIP truce plan, Dixon puts forward a plan whereby "the first step in demilitarisation should consist in withdrawal of Pakistan regular forces commencing on a named day" and "after a significant number of days from the named date, other operations on each side of ceasefire line should take place and as far as practicable, concurrently". Prime Minister Liaquat Ali of Pakistan questions reasoning behind the proposition but "expresses his readiness to accept" it "in compliance with" Dixon's "request". India, however, raises a number of objections to the rest of Dixon's proposals; these persist even after Dixon provides certain satisfactions to India with regard to her arguments over status of Azad Kashmir. Dixon notes that India does not "put forward any suggestion for amendment" of his plan "or offer any alternative solution".
- July 20-24: After shuttling between the two capitals, Dixon convenes summit meeting of the two Prime Ministers in his presence in Delhi from July 20-24. This is the highest point of face-to-face negotiations under UN auspices over Kashmir. At the conference, Dixon formulates three plans for placing entire State under one administration which would be collectively impartial and thus for removing all difficulties arising from "division of the State by the ceasefire line as a political boundary during period of the plebiscite". The single administration would alternatively be composed of coalition of Indian-sponsored regime and Azad Kashmir Movement, of "trusted persons outside politics" or of UN representatives. "None of the suggestions," he says "commended themselves to Prime Minister of India." In the end, says Dixon, "I became convinced that India's agreement would never be obtained to demilitarisation in any such form or to provisions governing the period of the plebiscite of any such charter as would ... (guard) against intimidation and other forms of influence and abuse ..." With this line of negotiation blocked, Dixon tries an imaginative approach. He suggests "holding a partial plebiscite including or consisting of the valley of Kashmir and partitioning the remainder of the State" between Pakistan and India according to already known wishes of different zones of the State. Pakistan expresses fear that attending a conference to consider this plan may mean abandoning demand for overall plebiscite in advance of agreement on an alternative plan. India agrees to attend such a conference. However, while Dixon is trying to assure Pakistan that its claim will remain unaffected as long as an alternative agreement does not emerge, India raises objections to his plan. "I came to the conclusion," says Dixon "that it would be impossible to give effect to doctrines formulated by India in objection to any plan for partition and a limited plebiscite which I could ask Pakistan to accept." These doctrines stem partly from India's contention that Pakistan's position is that of an aggressor in Kashmir. As a jurist, Dixon deals deftly with this contention. In the first place, he says in effect, he is not mandated to adjudicate the claim. Secondly, even if he assumes that Pakistan has acted in breach of international law, how can that detract from recognition of Pakistan's interest in Kashmir which is implied in agreement to the principle of plebiscite? The claim, whether factual or otherwise, is wholly devoid of relevance to Kashmir problem's settlement. In his report to Security Council, Dixon states, "If there is any chance of settling the dispute over Kashmir by agreement between Pakistan and India, it now lies in partition and is some means of allocating the occupied valley rather than overall plebiscite."
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